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BOOK REVIEW 
Preaching to Manager§ 
S El\S E Al'-i D NONSENSE IN CORPORATE fi NA NCE . By Louis Lowenstein. 1 Reading 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 1991. Pp. viii , 26 3. $24. 95 . 
Reviewed by Edward B. R ock2 
I. 
Who is the appropriate role model for the corporate law academic? Are we 
case crunchers, organizing and summarizing current doctrine ? Are we corporate 
engineers working to refine the system of checks and balances, of levers and 
counterweights, that control and channel management's discretion? Are we social 
scientists disinterestedly seeking to understand how the world of corporations works, 
patiently observing, measuring and modeling? Are we historians, tracing the 
doctrines and ideologies of capitalism? Are we political scientists, mapping the polit-
ical choices that determine and constrain corporate structure? Are we advocates 
without clients, writing briefs to persuade courts, agencies, or legislatures to reform 
the law? Are we arbitrageurs, trading on the latest results of finance economics? Or 
are we perhaps preachers, exhorting judges, legislators, and particularly managers 
and shareholders to cleave to virtue and avoid sin? 
Louis Lowenstein is one of corporate law 's very best preachers. With the credi-
bility that comes from having practiced corporate law, having managed a major 
corporation, and having written erudite law review articles replete with hundreds of 
footnotes, he thunders from his bully pulpit at Columbia, that cathedral of corpo-
rate law, the home of those great preachers of yesterday, Berte and Cary. In his 
latest collection of sermons, Sense and Nonsense in Corporate Finance, Professor 
Lowenstein continues his ministry of common sense and hard work, preaching 
primarily to corporate managers who are in danger of being led astray by the forces 
of evil. 
The saints in Professor Lowenstein's sermons are the hard working, no 
nonsense managers and investors who know that there are no free lunches, no easy 
solutions to difficult problems, and no substitutes for honesty, hard work, common 
sense, and a firm grasp of accounting . Benjamin Graham and David Dodd wrote the 
1. Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Finance and Law, Columbia University. 
2. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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holy scripture. 3 Warren Buffett is the living exemplar of the cardina l virtues and 
proof that one can live, even prosper, in their ligh t. 
T he sinners in Lowenstein's world are the snake oil salesmen (finance econo-
mists a nd investment bankers, mostly) who peddle new fa ngled high tech cu res for 
old corporate a ilments, the dishonest or benighted corporate managers who cause 
the a ilments fo r which snake oil is presented as a cure, and money man agers and 
other inves tors who are too lazy or inept to distinguish good compan ies from bad , 
indexing their funds instead. Pride, greed, and sloth characterize their fa ilings. By 
their sins, enor mou s economic devasta tion has been wrought. 
The core of the book is a series of very well told mora lity tal es. Chapter 2, Th e 
R oad to Ju nk Heaven: A Tale of Three Companies , is the Pa ra ble of the Depa rt-
ment Stores, a striking comparison of the fortunes of three retailers, Federated 
Department S tores , R.H. Macy, and May Department Stores. In 1985 , the core 
businesses of the three companies looked much a like. By the time Lowenstein wrote 
the book, after Federated had been acquired by Campeau with junk bonds, and 
R.H. Macy had gone private in a management leveraged buyou t, the comparison 
was markedly different. Federa ted was in Chapter 11 and Macy was close (subse-
quently to fa ll in), while May prospered at their misfortune. In a ll, according to 
Lowenstein, a sad and bitter "object lessons of the evil effects of excessive leverage" 
(p. 51). 4 
But the world is a complicated place, as Lowenstein consistently emphasizes. 
While Macy and Federated represent bad leveraged buyouts (LBOs), Lowenstein, 
in chapter 4, recognizes that LBOs can sometimes be good. As he shows in an 
instructive composite fictional account, LBOs can be soundly structured a nd fair to 
everyone, particularly in freeing a division from the deadening hand of conglom-
erate management. Like finance in general, LBOs are a modestly useful corporate 
structure. The crucia l ingredients, as elsewhere, are prudence and honesty . 
If too little cash (excessive leverage) poses one temptation, too much cash 
provides another. In chapters 6 through 8, Lowenstein considers the dangers of 
excess cash or what some now call "free cash flow ." We hear of the evil influence of 
finance economics, of the right way to grapple with the dilemma and finally are 
presented with contrasting stories of saints and sinners. 
Chapter 6, Cash Dividends: How the Business Schools Got it Wrong, is 
Lowenstein's account of the nonsense of financial economics' view of dividends . 
How, he asks, could finance economists take seriously Modigliani and Miller's 
3. BE NJA MIN GRAHAM, DAVID L. DODD & SIDNEY COTTLE. SECURITY ANALYSIS PRI NCI PLES AND 
TECHNIQUE (4th ed . 1962) . 
4. The comparison, like many of Lowenstein's other ta les, raises as ma ny q ues tions as it answers . 
Why was bankruptcy so costly? Is ba nkruptcy more costly in some industries th an in others? Why were 
so ma ny bankers so willing to fund buyouts th a t, in retrospect, made no sense? On Lowenstein 's account, 
it is easy to understa nd how Campeau, a bad merchant a nd a bad financier , failed. It is easy to under-
stand why a great merchandiser like Farrell of May Depa rtment Stores succeeded. But what about 
Macy? How is it that a first rate mercha nt like Finkelstein failed? Why did the new Macy issue so much 
debt a nd so littl e eq uit y? Why did soph ist ica ted investors like G E Capita l, Goldman Sachs, Laurence 
Tisch, a nd Mu tua l Shares not require Macy to maintain a stronger capital base? To say tha t Macy is a n 
obj ec t lesson of the evil effects of excessive leve rage may be to beg the most int eresting quest ions. 
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(MM) irrelevance thesis" when everyone with an ounce of common sense rea lizes 
that the amount of excess cash in the corporation will inevitably affect investment 
policy? How arrogant and unseemly for finance economists to describe the real 
world's concern for dividends and changes in dividend policy as "irrational 
prej udice" 6 or "optical illusion" (p. 119, n.l1). 7 Worse even than this hubris is the 
patina of respectability that MM gives to management's obvious preference to keep 
dividends as low as possible. If, as MM assert, dividend policy is irrelevant to sha re 
price and, moreover , tax foolish, why not just let management keep the money? 
Having, he thinks, disposed of finance economics as a source of wisdom,8 
Lowenstein turns in Chapter 7 to what he sees as the central issue, namely , "to keep 
the money or pay it out, that is the question" (p . 121). In doing so, Lowenstein 
highlights the danger of not paying dividends (namely, that management will waste 
the money), by recourse to some instructive tales. He quantifies the enormous cost 
to shareholders of the failed diversification programs of the former Na tional Steel 
(which left the steel business about which it knew something and lost $42.45 per 
share in businesses about which it apparently knew nothing) and Nortek (a defense 
contractor that launched a Drexel junk bond financed diversification effort). 
But one can fall into sin even while sticking to a core business . For Lowenstein, 
mining companies provide an illustration: "[p]erhaps they were overexposed as chil-
dren to the Con Ed signs in New York, 'Dig we must' " (p. 125). Mining executives 
know mining and love mining and seem unable to resist the temptation to spend the 
earnings of the few good years when prices are high on new mines, rather than 
treating them as windfalls and paying them out to shareholders . Cases in point are 
Hecla Mining (boasting that it owned the largest silver mine in the country which, 
unfortunately, was also losing money) and Denison Mines (which proclaimed that 
"carving a mine out of the wilderness . . . [is] a highly precise science and a finely 
tuned art"). 
But, of course, sometimes investing in core businesses is warranted, as in the 
case of Caterpillar, long a world leader in earth-moving equipment. Lowenstein 
lauds its determination to forego immediate gain and to invest vast sums in 
defending its franchise against Japanese competition. 
Chapter 8 continues the discussion of dividends, turning to one means of paying 
out free cash flow, the corporate share repurchase. Lowenstein provides marvelous 
contrasting accounts of Exxon, which has paid out a huge amount of free cash flow 
through share repurchases, and American Express, which has dissipated vast sums 
5. The irrelevance thesis asserts that dividend policy is irrelevant to stock prices if markets are 
perfect, future investments, profits, and dividends are known by the firm with certa inty, and inves tment 
policy is fixed ahead of time and unaltered by changes in dividend policy. STEPHEN A. Ross & 
RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD. CORPORATE fiNANCE 405 (1988). 
6. Lowenstein cites RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C MYERS. PRI NCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
fiNANCE 350 (3d ed. 1988). 
7. Lowenstein cites Merton Miller, Can Management Use Dividends to Influ ence the Value of the 
Firm?, in THE REVOL UTIO N IN CORPORATE FI:-IA NC E 299 (Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds., 
1986). 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24. 
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in unsuccessful diversification. By Lowenstein's calculation, American Express, 
blessed with one of the great corporate franchises, the American Express Card and 
Traveler's Checks, wasted more than half of shareholders' value in its vain attempt 
to become a global financial supermarket. 
In the end, Lowenstein 's advice on free cash flow is similar to his advice on 
every other hard question of corporate finance. There are no easy answers. General 
rul es and models do not work . Instead , one must make the decision patiently and 
wisely, only investing free cash flow when management truly, honestly, and skepti-
cally believes that doing so will create at least a doll a r of value for a dollar of 
retained earnings. If management is honest, intelligent, and knows its own limits, it 
will generally do a pretty good job. 
In a final chapter, Lowenstein turns his attention to shareholders, a topic on 
which he spent more time in his first book. 9 Here the saints are the good, useful 
shareholders (like Pierre DuPont in GM and Warren Buffett in everything he owns) 
who are wise and patient, providing stability, counseling, and direction to manage-
ment. Such shareholders have la rge enoug h stakes that it is in their interests to 
become involved in the company, looking out for the interests of all shareholders in 
looking out for their own interests. The sinners are those shareholders who trade 
constantly and who snap up any premium bid that comes their way, "unwilling to 
recognize any responsibility that [goes] beyond immediate market gains" (p. 220). 
But how do the large institutional investors who index a substantial portion of 
their portfolios fit into this moral landscape? On the one hand, they do not trade, 
and thus can credibly claim a long term interest in their portfolio companies. But 
how can they claim to "resemble a Warren Buffett, who invests Berkshire 
Hathaway's capital in large sums, in only a handful of companies, each of which he 
carefully selects and monitors" (p. 222). Here Lowenstein is unsure. While urging 
investors to become more like Warren Buffett, he also recognizes that passive 
indexing is likely to be the most profitable course for large investors. Much as he 
would like the indexers to assume a Buffett-like role, he recognizes that the major 
cost advantage of indexing leaves little margin for the monitoring and discipline of 
management of portfolio companies. As he puts it, "two basis points, or even four, 
do not buy much corporate oversight" (p. 228). Only time will tell whether 
CalPERS is a saint or a sinner. 
Lowenstein also devotes chapters to criticizing stock splits and stock dividends, 
and to decrying what he sees as the pernicious nonsense of using the capital asset 
pricing model for internal corporate capital budgeting. Throughout, he does a 
marvelous job presenting technical financial issues in plain language. He constantly 
emphasizes the importance of financial accounting, and how much an insightful 
reader can learn from publicly available disclosure documents. Lowenstein also 
effectively discusses "funny money," pay-in-kind, and zero coupon junk bonds that 
appeared in the waning years of the 1980s takeover boom. 
9. LOUI S LOW ENSTEII' , WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND TH E 
ABSEI'TEE SHA REHO LDER (1988) . 
I 
j 
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II. 
What is one to make of these tales? In Lowenstein's rendition, the stories of 
Federated, Macy, National Steel, Nortek, Hecla Mines, Denison Mining, and 
American Express are pretty awful. 'vVe can all supplement the list of sinners. Like-
wise, the saints are pretty inspiring . If only my folks had given me 100 shares of 
Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway for my eighth birthday in 1964 when it was 
trading at $16 per share or so, shares that are now worth around $8,000 each! 
In reflecting on these stories, one should be struck by the ineffectiveness of the 
various market restraints in rooting out sin. The hyperactive market for corporate 
control did nothing to prevent American Express from frittering away its share-
holders' money. The public debt markets failed to restrain FederatedjCampeau or 
Macy from their headlong plunge to their deaths. Indeed, they egged them on. The 
market for managers did nothing to prevent the ill advised diversification pursued 
by National Steel and Nortek and countless other conglomerates. Competitive 
product markets did little to constrain the unprofitable expansion and exploration by 
Hecla and Denison. While all these firms undoubtedly had the most up to date and 
elaborate incentive compensation schemes, managers still went badly wrong. 
The legal and institutional checks, little mentioned by Lowenstein, fared no 
better. Boards of Directors have stood idly by while bad decision was piled upon bad 
decision. Derivative suits provided no check. Proxy fights were hardly a blip on the 
screen. The courts were entirely absent. Behavior that, in retrospect and in Lowen-
stein's rendition, constituted gross violations of the duty of care went unadjudicated. 
The horror stories clearly show the limited extent to which either market or institu-
tional or legal mechanisms constrain management discretion. 
At the same time, the structure of constraints on management discretion does 
little to explain the success of the saints. Many of those responsible for the saints' 
sterling performances would have personally done just as well, or perhaps better, 
had they worked less hard or frittered away the shareholders' money. But they did 
not do so. 
This is a more general point. I am not alone in the uneasy sense I have at the 
end of the basic corporations course or a seminar on corporate governance. The 
market, institutional, and legal constraints that limit and channel management 
discretion, and on which we spend so much time, seem so impotent. 1° Can it be that 
corporate law is really about what it at least superficially seems to be about? Can it 
really be about perfecting an array of sticks and carrots, of constraints and incen-
tives, that align managements' interests with those of the shareholders? 
If neither markets, courts, nor institutional structures provide robust checks on 
management discretion, how is it that managers, on the whole, seem to do a pretty 
good job and millions entrust their savings to corporations? Likewise, we need to 
explain how it is that some managers go astray. In other words, what distinguishes 
the saints from the sinners? 
10. for a probing and comprehensive discussion of the ineffectiveness of market, legal, and institu-
tional restraints, see CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (197 5). 
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One answer, it seems to me, starts from the recogni tion that ma nagers, like the 
rest of us, generally try to do their best. I prepare for cl ass fo r a whole variety of 
reasons: because I get pleasure out of doing the best I can, because I am embar-
rassed to appear before my students unprepared, because I fee l a sense of obligation 
to my students , because my colleagues value preparation, because I want to get 
tenure. I would expect that most corporate managers work hard fo r a similar variety 
of reasons: because doing a good job is often pleasurabl e, because of a sense of 
obliga tion to coworkers, because it is the right thing to do, because they want to 
keep their jobs. We are all motiva ted a nd constrained much t11ore by social norms 
than we a re by markets, institutional structures, or laws. 
In Lowenstein's tales, the good managers had a cleare r and better view of wha t 
their jobs were and of how they should perform them. They realized that they were 
stewards of other people's money and that they should not spend it, either in 
acquiring new businesses or in investing in the core business, unless they were darn 
sure that it would benefit shareholders . They realized th a t their jobs were to build 
strong compa nies , not to engage in financial manipulation for personal gain, nor to 
cave in to pressure from short term investors for a quick profit. 11 They were humble, 
realizing that paying out excess cash to the shareholders was a source of pride, not 
shame. They realized that the wealth of the country is generated by people who get 
their hands dirty in unspectacular places like Toledo, not fl ashy financiers in places 
like Wall Street. They realized that the significance of finance pales in comparison 
to research, development, and manufacturing. 
If we take this explanation seriously, it becomes clearer what Lou Lowenstein 
is all about. He is in the business of generating and reinforcing norms for managers 
and shareholders, a task that explains the deeply normative character of his writing 
on corporate law. Contrasting narratives of saints and sinners, parables, inspira-
tional and cautionary tales , are all classic means of establishing standards, of 
shaping conduct. Whenever I turn to Lowenstein's work, I am immediately struck 
by the extent to which he transforms corporate law into a bra nch of public morality. 
This perspective also provides the most intelligible account of what it is that the 
Delaware courts do. In the long and rich narratives that form a very large part of 
every opinion, the Delaware courts can best be understood as providing us with 
contrasting tales of good and bad behavior, and as providing, by means of these 
II. Consider Lowenstein 's moral vision, expressed through the words of Charles E. O'Rourke, his 
hypothetical CEO: 
"[A company] is a social institution-one of some importance .. . An institution organ-
ized for profit but a social one nonetheless .. . Good, fairly priced drugs are the reason we 
exist. Shareholders have a role in that scheme. They contribute capita l, and they are enti-
tled (by dividends and price appreciation) to the profits. They are entitled to monitor 
management and to intervene, if necessary, to be sure that management is competent and 
honest. But stock price appreciation is the consequence, the mere reflection, of a successful 
enterprise, rather than the overriding objective. 
"The rhetoric of private property tends to obscure this bas ic distinction .... 
[Through " greed factors"] we tempt people to become individua lly richer even though their 
companies and society are left poor (pp. 62-63). 
r 
I 
l 
I 
' 
I 
I 
;t 
j 
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illustrative accounts, fundamental pieces of the job descriptions of corporate direc-
tors, managers, and counsel. Fortunately, the Delaware courts usually tell the 
stories well: in reading and teaching the cases, I can almost always remember the 
stories, even when 1 have difficulty distilling the principles of law. 
Thin k fir st of the sinners. We are troubled by the able but uninformed directors 
in S mith v. Van Gorkom , who couldn ' t be bothered to act with due care before 
lett ing th e chairman and C EO sell the company for what we are told was an inade-
quate price. 1 2 In Unocal, we are asked to frown at the despicable attempt by T. 
Boone Pickens to take over the company (or extort greenmail) by the clever but evil 
" two-tier , front-end-loaded, classically coercive, bust-up, junk-bond-fueled tender 
offer. " 13 In Rev/on, we are asked to shudder at the spectacle of Michel Bergerac 
and the directors neglecting the interests of their shareholders because of Bergerac's 
"s trong personal antipathy" for Ronald Perelman, or out of a craven desire to avoid 
liability to bondholders. 14 In A-fills, we condemn the management team 's trans-
parent attempts to steal the company, and the directors' divided loyalties that led 
them to fa il to provide any serious oversight.~~ 
And consider the saints. We admire Peter Atkins who so ably kept RJR 
Nabisco's special committee focused on the interests of shareholders after their 
CEO sought to buy the company. 16 We are urged to respect Time's directors, who 
followed their well documented, comprehensive long range strategic plan, modifying 
the structure of the transaction to protect their shareholders from the threat posed 
to the corporate enterprise by Paramount's uninvited offer. 17 We are meant to 
applaud the eight independent outside directors of Unocal who, after meeting sepa-
rately with Unocal's financial advisers and attorneys, rejected Mesa's "grossly 
inadequate" tender offer and subsequently directed a proportional response to 
Picken's threat to their shareholders .18 The Delaware Chancellor's non-judicial 
speeches and writings are often of a similar character. 19 
What makes these contrasting narratives even more compelling is that the 
Delaware courts name names. The opinions collectively create a hall of honor and a 
hall of shame. Managers and lawyers reading them first or second hand must reflect 
upon the prospect of public praise or censure. One hears anecdotes of the fury of 
those who believe that they have been unjustly maligned by the Delaware courts. 
To say that Lowenstein, like the Delaware courts, is in the business of gener-
ating and enforcing norms for corporate management and shareholders, states 
12. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
13. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Andrew G.T. Moore, II, The 
J980s-Did We Save The Stockholders While the Corporation Burned? , 70 WASH. U L.Q. 277, 282 
( 1992) . 
14. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A .2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986). 
15. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Del. 1988). 
16. In re RJR Nabisco Shareholder Litig ., [ 1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 94,194 (Del. Ch . 1989) . 
17. Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) . 
18. Unoca l Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 950 (Del. 1985). 
19. See. e. g. , William T . Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or 
Fantasy?, 45 Bus. LAW. 2055 (1990). 
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rather than answers the more fundamental and contested question: W hat should the 
content of those norms be'l How do we (as citizens or as shareholders) want corpo-
rate managers and shareholders to behave? Much of the heat in Lowenstein's 
writing, here and elsewhere, seems to me to derive from a deep felt commitment to 
a particular set of norms that he seeks to further against a competing set that claim 
support from the results of finance economics. He sets forth twelve "Basic Rules or 
Principles," norms illustrated in his accounts of saints and sinners (pp. 8-12). In 
Lowenstein's view, he is defending the traditional virtues of patience, hard work, 
and humility against corporate finance's siren song of easy money and vast gains 
from "financial engineering ." 
Characterizing saints and sinners is tricky. For some, the saints of Lowenstein's 
or the Delaware courts' tales are sinners of the worst sort. Similarly the sinners, 
while perhaps somewhat unsavory, may be seen as heroic upon further reflection. As 
one relatively uncharged example of the difficulty, consider Lowenstein's reverence 
for Graham and Dodd. It is far from obvious that we want the money managers 
who control the large institutional investors to be Graham/Dodd "value investors." 
Given the enormous volume of empirical evidence that active management, with its 
attendant trading and management costs, consistently underperforms the market 
indices, indexing should perhaps be viewed not as sloth but as the efficient and 
prudent stewardship of other people's money. If monitoring management with a 
Buffett-like intensity does not improve portfolio performance, it is not at all clear 
that we, either as pension fund participants or as citizens, really want to encourage 
such behavior C~.mong institutional investors. Maybe yes, maybe no, but one cannot 
look to commcm sense alone for the answer. 
Similarly, common sense cannot provide the answers to a host of other funda-
mental normative and at least partly empirical questions that underpin our 
judgments of virtue and sin. Whether the LBO form is superior to the publicly held 
corporation, as Michael Jensen claims, depends at least in part on whether bank-
ruptcy costs are large or smal l. 20 Whether hostile tender offers are to be encouraged 
or decried depends, at least in part, on whether they create wealth or destroy it. 
Whether corporate diversification is generally wise or foolish depends, at least in 
part, on whether diversification can be achieved more efficiently at the firm level or 
at the portfolio level. 
Lowenstein's hostility to the normative conclusions that some derive from 
finance economics interferes with an appreciation of the substantial contributions 
that it makes to corporate law and business practice. Take, for example, his treat-
ment of the Modigliani and Miller irrelevance theorem. To Lowenstein, this 
epitomizes the nonsense of finance economics. 
But Lowenstein's shot flies wide of its mark. Of course MM does not describe 
the real world: it is a model of the polar case. What makes the Modigliani-Miller 
thesis so seminal is that it sets the stage for subsequent analysis. As one recent 
20. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 
61. For a response, see Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation, HARY. Bus. 
REv., Jan.- Feb. 1990, at 96. 
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study explains, the "'dividend irrelevance proposition' has led to much subsequent 
resea rch focusing on two rel ated issues~the tax effects of dividend yield on stock 
valuation and the explanation for the observed price reactions to dividend 
an nouncements." 21 
Fina nce economists have long recognized that the market does not find divi-
dends irrelevant. 22 The challenge is to figure out what features best explain this 
behavior . Indeed , Lowenstei n' s favored explanation, that excess cash will alter the 
inves tment plans, has been extensivel y discussed by economists. 23 Even the basic 
finance textbooks that Lowenstein ci tes as the source of the confusion include refer-
ences to the various expl anations for dividends, including agency cost expl anations. 24 
The fact tha.t the introductory finance texts spend so much time discussing the basic 
MM model does not mean th a t the texts are teaching students that the model 
describes the real world. Rather, it reflects how difficult it is to teach an abstract 
model. 
While I am ignorant and therefore agnostic on whether MM and the literature 
it spawned has value in the business context, its "modestly useful" promise, like that 
of much else in corpora te finance , is to make more rigorous the application of 
common sense. As Lowenstein himself explains, dividend policy must be set with an 
eye both to the financing needs of the firm, the demands of the market, and tax 
consequences (pp. 121-43) . The MM literature potentially provides a model for 
tying these competing considerations together, a method of thinking about them in a 
systematic fashion. 
Lowenstein, although acknowledging corporate finance or finance economics as 
a "modestly useful discipline," spends little time exploring its uses (p. 22). I, at 
least, am grateful that a branch of economics devotes its efforts to gathering and 
analyzing the data fundamental to corporate law . In this regard, corporate law 
academics are far better off than our colleagues in , say, bankruptcy, who have had 
to learn to collect such critical data themselves. 2° Corporate finance may only be a 
21. Mukesh Bajaj & Anand M. Yijh, Dividend Clienteles and the Information Content of Divi-
dend Changes, 26 J FIN. ECON. 193 (1990). 
22 . See, e.g., Eugene Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen & Richard Roll, The Adjust-
ment of Stock Prices to New Information , 10 INT'L EcoN. REv. I (1969); R. Richardson Pettit, 
Dividend Announcements, S ecurity Performance. and Capiwl Markets Efficiency , 27 J . FI N. 993 ( 1972); 
Joseph Aharony & ltzhak Swary, Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholders' 
Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 35 J . FI N. I (1980). 
23. See, e.g., Larry H.P. Lang & Robert H. Litzenberger, Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow 
S ignaling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis?, 24 J. FIN. EcoN. 181 (1989); Michael C. Jensen, Agency 
Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. EcoN. REv. 323 ( 1986); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. EcoN. REv. 650 (1984); Michael 
Rozeff, How Companies Set Their Dividend Payout Ratios, in THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE 
FINANCE 320 (Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds., 1986); Michael S. Rozeff, Growth, Beta and 
Agency Costs as Determinations of Dividend Payout Ratios, 5 l FIN. REs. 249 ( 1982); Bajaj & Vijh , 
supra note 21, at 214-17. 
24. See, e.g., Ross & WESTERFIELD, supra note 5, at 416-19; RICHARD A BREALEY & STEWART 
C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 382-83 (4th ed. 1991) . 
25. See, e.g. , TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARRE N & JAY \VESTBROOK. As WE fORGIVE 
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"modestly useful discipline," but that is not so shabby. Corporate law, in either its 
academic or law firm incarnations , can hardl y claim more. 
The very best sermons leave you thinking. They inspire, they amuse, they 
inform, they ca ution , they disturb, they provoke. In Sense and Nonsense, Louis 
Lowenstein does all these and more. Read the book. 
